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THE PROPRIETY OF RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS: 
A RESPONSE TO SAGER 
CHRISTOPHER C. LUND* 
It is a sincere pleasure to be here to respond to Professor Lawrence Sager. I 
began thinking about these things fifteen years ago as a student in his church-
state class. Professor Sager and I are close together on these issues. We think 
religious freedom is important. We think gay rights are important. And we 
think the American political, legal, and constitutional traditions are all properly 
concerned with protecting both—and, in a sense, protecting both equally. The 
goal is to enable people to live their lives in accord with their true identities, as 
much as possible. All people should be able to pursue their deep 
commitments—to be who they really are, LGBT people, religious people, all 
people. Though—and this is going to be a theme of mine—the variety of kinds 
of commitments may require an equal variety in the manners in which different 
commitments are accommodated. 
Professor Sager and I agree on many things related to church and state. But 
to make it interesting, I’m going to focus most on where we disagree. Because 
I think our disagreements are actually somewhat helpful. Disagreements are 
unproductive when people start too far apart. But Professor Sager and I start 
very close together yet end up going somewhat different directions. So I want 
to talk about two things where we part company a little, which will correspond 
to certain parts of his Childress Lecture. First, I want to say something about 
the historical part of his lecture—the history of religious exemptions. Second, I 
want to talk about need for religious exemptions. 
 
 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. This essay is a footnoted and 
lightly edited version of oral remarks presented at Saint Louis University School of Law in 
response to the 2015 Childress Lecture delivered by Lawrence Sager. Some of the things 
discussed briefly here—especially the latter half of these remarks—will be elaborated more fully 
in Christopher C. Lund, Religion is Special Enough, 103 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017). 
Thanks to the Saint Louis University Law Journal and its editors for inviting me; to Chad 
Flanders, for all his thoughtful advice; and especially to Lawrence Sager, a true scholar, generous 
mentor, and (most importantly) kind and caring human being. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
602 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:601 
Let me start with a few comments about history. The way that Professor 
Sager tells it, American history lines up against religious exemptions. Reynolds 
back in the nineteenth century rejected exemptions for polygamy.1 Smith in the 
twentieth century rejected exemptions for peyote use.2 In between, there was 
Yoder and a few other cases.3 But those cases were exceptional, against the 
dominant trust of the jurisprudence. Smith brought us back to the truth, back to 
Reynolds. And this isn’t just Professor Sager’s view. This is the stance Justice 
Scalia takes back in Smith.4 
But there’s more to this story, I think. Our history with religious 
exemptions is more complicated than Smith let on. Take Reynolds, for one 
thing. Does Reynolds say no exemptions, ever?5 Or no exemptions in a case 
like this?6 The latter, of course, could easily sound like the compelling-interest 
test. America in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries regulated peoples’ 
sexual lives much more than it does today.7 No matter the test, it’s impossible 
to imagine the Supreme Court in 1878 giving constitutional protection to 
polygamy. Frankly, I doubt the Court is much inclined to do that today. 
I wonder if the fairest reading of Reynolds is simply that the Court was 
against that kind of religious exemption with all other questions being pushed 
off to the future. And when that future arrived, in cases like Sherbert and 
Yoder, the Court adopted religious exemptions as a way of protecting 
America’s burgeoning religious pluralism. The Court said that if the 
government wanted to burden religious exercise, it had to have a very good 
reason.8 To be sure, exemptions were largely jettisoned as a constitutional 
matter in Smith. But Smith too is only part of the story. Smith has been, in 
 
 1. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1878). 
 2. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
 3. The most important cases were Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and Sherbert v. 
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). But there were a few others as well: Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t 
Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); 
Hobbie v. Unemp’t Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987). 
 4. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878–82 (“We have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs 
excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free 
to regulate. . . . We first had occasion to assert that principle in Reynolds . . . . [and] the rule to 
which we have adhered ever since Reynolds plainly controls [this case].”). 
 5. See, e.g., Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166 (“Laws are made for the government of actions, and 
while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.”). 
 6. See, e.g., id. at 164 (“Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, 
but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good 
order. Polygamy has always been odious among the northern and western nations of 
Europe . . . . ”) (emphasis added). 
 7. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 
438 (1972); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973). 
 8. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214. 
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significant part though certainly not entirely, superseded by legislative 
developments.9 
Here’s a simple and undisguisable truth. Religious exemptions are the law 
now, in most places. The federal government and more than half the states 
have the compelling-interest test.10 Religious exemptions are thus a matter of 
right in a majority of United States jurisdictions. With the federal government, 
exemptions have now been the rule for more than fifty years, with just a short 
three-year interregnum. And many of the states, like my home state of 
Michigan, have had the compelling-interest test for the full fifty years.11 
Now there has, as Professor Sager said, been some difficulty at defining 
“religion.”12 But I don’t think that this has been a big problem. The Court has 
kept its definition properly broad. And the remaining boundary questions, 
though fascinating, rarely come up in real life. Every year I have to counsel 
students against adopting this as a topic for seminar papers. Similarly, Smith’s 
fears of anarchy seem a little overwrought now.13 The federal government and 
most states have the compelling-interest test now and have had it for decades.14 
If the compelling-interest test caused anarchy, we would know it by now. 
I don’t want to press all this too hard on you. I’m not trying to convince 
you of the opposite of Professor Sager’s view. I’m not arguing that all the 
history lines up in favor of religious exemptions. That’s not true either. What 
I’m saying is that our tradition is profoundly mixed on the issue of exemptions. 
At some times and in some places, we’ve given exemptions and had rules 
requiring exemptions. And at some times and in some places, we’ve denied 
exemptions and had rules denying exemptions. Our history is indelibly mixed. 
There is, in fact, an article out there waiting for someone to write about all 
this. I’ll even give you the title: “The History of the History of the Free 
Exercise Clause.” Before Smith, I would have said that our constitutional 
 
 9. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012); Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012). See also Christopher C. 
Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. REV. 466 (2010) 
(discussing state RFRAs and state constitutional provisions providing Sherbert/Yoder-style 
protection). 
 10. Lund, supra note 9, at 466–67. 
 11. E.g., McCready v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723, 729 (Mich. 1998) (explaining that 
“religious freedom [claims] under art 1, § 4 of the Michigan Constitution [are analyzed] . . . under 
the compelling state interest test . . . .”); Porth v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Kalamazoo, 532 
N.W.2d 195, 199 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (“Michigan courts have always applied a strict scrutiny 
test to state regulation of religious freedom.”). 
 12. Lawrence Sager, Keynote Address at the Saint Louis University School of Law 
Childress Lecture: Religious Freedom, Social Justice and Public Policy (Nov. 13, 2015), 
http://law.slu.edu/event/childresslecture2015 [http://perma.cc/3LEA-3TLB]. 
 13. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990) (“Any society adopting such a system 
[the compelling-interest test] would be courting anarchy . . . .”). 
 14. Lund, supra note 9, at 466–67. 
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tradition tilted somewhat in favor of religious exemptions—after all, Sherbert 
and Yoder were governing law. Smith changed that, of course. But Smith did 
not just change the law; it tried to change the history too. Smith said the truth 
was that we had never given exemptions: Note the importance of the words 
“never” and “ever since” in one of Smith’s key passages: 
We have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from 
compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is 
free to regulate . . . . We first had occasion to assert that principle in 
Reynolds . . . . [and] the rule to which we have adhered ever since Reynolds 
plainly controls [this case].15 
But, curiously enough, the history now has been changed back—apparently 
without Justice Scalia noticing. The idea that the no-exemptions position has 
always been our law—a core claim of Smith—has been quietly abandoned. In 
Holt v. Hobbs, for example, a unanimous Court treated Smith not as continuous 
with earlier precedent but as a fundamental departure from it: 
Smith largely repudiated the method of analysis used in prior free exercise 
cases like Wisconsin v. Yoder . . . and Sherbert v. Verner . . . . In those cases, 
we employed a balancing test that considered whether a challenged 
government action that substantially burdened the exercise of religion was 
necessary to further a compelling state interest.16 
Everyone knows about the Court’s ability to make and remake the law. But 
here it has had an amazing ability to make and remake the history, too. I guess 
this is a call for skepticism. Don’t believe everything that people tell you. 
 
 
 
Let me now say something about the propriety of exemptions. The reason 
why our system keeps coming back to religious exemptions is, I think, fairly 
simple. It is impossible to maintain genuine religious pluralism without 
religious exemptions. Think of the Native Americans in Smith, the peyote 
case.17 The law forbids peyote; Native Americans use peyote in their religious 
rituals; those religious rituals cannot survive without religious exemptions. 
The history of exemptions goes way back—back before the Founding. 
Groups like the Quakers demanded religious exemptions. And they demanded 
exemptions not only from religious requirements (like church taxes and 
religious oaths), but also from secular ones (like the draft). Massachusetts, for 
instance, exempted Quakers from serving in the militia all the way back in 
 
 15. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878–82 (emphasis added). 
 16. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859–60 (2015). 
 17. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874. 
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1757.18 What has changed in the centuries since the Founding is the scope of 
the problem. The kinds of religious claims have grown; there are more 
religious groups now, greater variety between religious groups, and greater 
variety in religious practices. And the kinds of legal obligations have also 
grown. Government regulates a lot more now; the modern twenty-first century 
regulatory state bears almost no resemblance to America in 1787. Smith used 
the word “anarchy” because it saw there being so many possible conflicts 
between religious practice and legal obligation. But it cuts the other way too. 
Precisely because there are so many conflicts, many religious practices (and 
faiths) won’t survive without exemptions. 
Professor Sager knows this to be the case. And in his writings, he’s often 
quite warm to religious exemptions in particular cases. He wants to protect the 
peyote use in Smith.19 He wants to protect the hoasca use in Gonzales.20 I 
haven’t asked him this, but I feel pretty confident he would want to protect the 
Muslim prisoner in Holt v. Hobbs.21 Yet the results in those cases were reached 
under statutes like RFRA, under the compelling-interest test. And I don’t know 
if they would have been reached otherwise. 
So why is this? Why is Professor Sager attracted to religious exemptions in 
these particular cases, but against religious exemptions in general? It’s for one 
fundamental reason. Professor Sager worries that religious exemptions 
privilege religious commitments over other kinds of commitments.22 And I 
understand this concern. In a way, I share it. But I think he’s trying to solve it 
the wrong way. 
There’s a single sentence in one of his articles that I think captures both his 
view and where I differ with him. Here’s the sentence: “An important theme of 
this essay is that religion does not exhaust the commitments and passions that 
move human beings in deep and valuable ways.”23 I’ve always been struck by 
this sentence. It’s not that I think Sager is wrong. It’s that I think Sager is so 
plainly right. Of course, religious commitments are not the only kinds of 
 
 18. Douglas Laycock, Sex, Atheism, and the Free Exercise of Religion, 88 U. DET. MERCY 
L. REV. 407, 410 (2011). 
 19. CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 93 (2007). 
 20. Id. at 265–66. See also Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 
U.S. 418, 429–30 (2006). 
 21. See Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015). 
 22. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 19, at 82 (calling RFRA an “entitle[ment] to disregard 
laws that get in the way of their religious convictions.”); Id. (referring to a “get-out-of-jail-free 
privilege”); Id. at 262 (stating RFRA “give[s] religiously motivated persons a presumptive right 
to disobey laws that [get] in their way.”). 
 23. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The 
Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1245 n.dd 
(1994). 
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commitments that should be protected. Of course, religion doesn’t exhaust the 
commitments and passions that move people in deep and valuable ways. Many 
other things are important to human beings. But religion nevertheless remains 
one of those things—it remains one of the things most important to human 
beings. And so instead of removing the protections we give to religion, we 
should be interested in protecting other kinds of deep concerns, too. If there’s a 
problem here, that’s the way to go about fixing it. 
So, for example, we should protect secular conscience. I think the Court 
did a good job of that in cases like Seeger and Welsh.24 We should protect 
speech and assembly, sexual liberties, contract and property. We should protect 
race and gender, sexual orientation and disability. The law should strive to 
protect all kinds of deep commitments. But that’s not a reason to take away the 
protection given specifically to religious commitments. It’s a call to broaden 
protections. To add categories that we think capture the other varieties of deep 
human commitment. “Religion” is not a perfect category. But no category is 
perfect. All categories are over and under inclusive. All categories involve 
cases at the margins and people who are just slightly beyond the margins. 
That’s inevitable with categories. 
The problem here is one of administration. In the framework of a written 
Constitution, it’s impossible to protect the category of “deep and valuable 
commitments.” It’s not administrable. In the context of a written Constitution, 
the way to protect “deep and valuable commitments” is by naming certain 
specific deep and valuable commitments. We start with the ones we know. We 
keep an open mind about the rest. Religion is not the only thing in that 
category, to be sure. But religion is in that category. 
To be sure, religion is somewhat unique in that it involves “exemptions” 
from generally applicable laws. But other rights involve exemptions too. Free 
speech sometimes involves exemptions from generally applicable laws.25 
Abortion rights sometimes involve exemptions from generally applicable 
laws.26 Free exercise isn’t entirely unique this way. 
Even so, it is certainly true that religious liberty is different from those 
rights—with free exercise, the focus always seems to be exemptions. But that’s 
just because religion is slightly different than other things. I’m not saying that 
religion is categorically more important than those other things—though of 
course some people will feel that way. It’s simply that religious liberty is 
sufficiently different in structure that accommodation of it looks different than 
the accommodation of other human needs. It’s the old Latin phrase, mutatis 
 
 24. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 
(1970). 
 25. See Christopher C. Lund, Free Exercise Reconceived: The Logic and Limits of Hosanna-
Tabor, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1183, 1201 (2014) (making this point and providing citations). 
 26. See id. at 1201–02 (making this point and providing citations). 
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mutandis. Whenever one translates a principle—whether the principle be 
justice or fairness or toleration or what have you—from one domain to another, 
one has to make changes in the practical operation of the principle. 
Religion is not the only deep and valuable human commitment. But it is a 
deep and valuable human commitment. And religious exemptions are what it 
looks like when society treats religion as a deep and valuable human 
commitment. 
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